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The Impact of Recent Money




The Proceeds of Crime Act 19951 is the newest of several
recent pieces of legislation designed to remove the ill-gotten gains
of criminal activity from those involved with "dirty money." It
follows hard on the heels of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA
1993),2 which introduced a wide array of offenses designed to
combat the threat of money laundering. While not the first piece
of legislation with such a purpose, the CJA 1993 is a major bulwark
in the United Kingdom's anti-laundering legislation, creating
several offenses for what might at first seem barely criminal
behavior. Further, the Money Laundering Regulations3 (the
Regulations) of the same year place an onerous burden on financial
institutions to incorporate systems to combat laundering.
The CJA 1993 and the Regulations, enacted to fulfill the
United Kingdom's obligations arising from the EC Money Launder-
ing Directive,4 together mark a major overhaul of Britain's
legislation in this area. This Article considers their implications,
and those of the Proceeds of Crime Act, for financial intermediar-
ies. It first briefly outlines the importance of money laundering to
the modem criminal. The Article then explains the inherent threat
posed to financial institutions by money laundering. The Article
concludes with an overview of the recent legislation.
* © 1996 Nicholas Clark.
* Graduate from Magdalene College, Univ. of Cambridge (England) in Law,
1995. Mr. Clark is currently completing professional examinations before
commencing training as a solicitor in the city of London in February, 1997.
1. Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 (Eng.) [hereinafter The Crime Act].
2. Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Eng.).
3. SI 1933/1993 (Eng.).
4. Council Directive No. 91/308/EEC, O.J. L 166/77 (1991) [hereinafter EC
Money Laundering Directive].
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The article's central theme is then explored: the uneasy and
ill-defined relationship between civil and criminal liability. There
are very real dangers posed to the banking industry by the
suspicion-based reporting system. The last few years have seen a
judicial willingness to impose what amounts to liability as a
constructive trust on those who knowingly assist in the disposal of
funds in a fraudulent breach of trust.' At the same time, the
recent money laundering legislation perpetuates the "know your
client" ideal of the Financial Services Act 1986.6 Is such knowl-
edge not dangerous in view of the potential civil liability faced by
a financial intermediary who comes to know too much? Bearing
in mind the potential financial catastrophe facing an intermediary
unaware of the civil law consequences of "over-compliance" with
the new legislation, this question is of particular relevance at the
moment. It is the author's belief that the recent plethora of
decisions on liability for assistance in a breach of trust can only add
to the dangers.
The answer, if any, to the previous question rests on the vexed
issue of the state of knowledge required for intermeddler liability
to be imposed. The recent judgments of the courts in this area are
considered side by side with an examination of what knowledge is
required of financial intermediaries by the new legislation. In
particular, the implications of the decisions in Finers (a firm) v.
Miro,7 Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson' and Royal Brunei Airlines v.
Tan9 are considered.
Further consideration is given to another problem the financial
services industry may face: claims against institutions for refusing
to carry out a client's instructions if they have disclosed their
suspicions to the authorities. If a financial intermediary reports a
suspicion which is found to be groundless, the Criminal Justice Act
gives it immunity from actions for breach of confidence," yet
leaves open the possibility of a claim for defamation or breach of
contract.
5. See, in particular the decision of Millett J. in Agip (Africa) v. Jackson
[1990] Ch. 265, and of the Privy Council in Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan, [1995]
2 A.C. 378, [1995] 3 All E.R. 97, [1995] 3 W.L.R. 64. See also Third Party Liable
to Beneficiaries for Loss in Breach of Trust, TIMES (London), May 29, 1995, at
Features.
6. Financial Services Act 1986 (Eng.).
7. [1991] 1 W.L.R. 35.
8. [19911 Ch. 547.
9. Royal Brunei Airlines, [1995] 2 A.C. 378.
10. Criminal Justice Act 1988, § 93A (Eng.).
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II. Money Laundering and Its Importance to the Criminal
The modem money launderer will no doubt adopt rather more
sophisticated techniques than the gem carriers of India or the
Knights Templar, but his objectives and essential modus
operandi will be the same. The objectives will be to obscure
the source and thus the nature of the wealth in question and
the modus operandi will inevitably involve resort to transac-
tions, real or imagined, which will be designed to confuse the
onlooker and confound the enquirer."
Money laundering, simply, is the process by which the
proceeds of crime or fraud are made to appear as if they have
emanated from a legitimate source. Today, this typically involves
a complex web of transactions, often across several jurisdictions, so
that the proceeds of violent crime in, for example, Italy, resurfaces
as the seemingly normal profits of a pizza restaurant in New York.
The aim is thoroughly to confuse any investigator attempting to
trace the "hot" money either by "losing" it or by creating an
intricate web of transactions that is virtually impossible to follow.
By any criteria, the global level of money laundering is staggering.
In 1989, the Financial Action Task Force estimated that the money
laundered globally through banks amounted to some $85 billion
each year.12
There are various reasons, commented on by Haynes," why
money laundering is an increasing focus of law enforcement
agencies. Originally, these agencies fought organized crime by
seeking to imprison those at its heart. This was ineffective and thus
asset forfeiture was viewed as the key to combating such crime. If
the criminal is prevented from enjoying the fruits of his labor, then
his motivation for committing that crime also disappears. As the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration found, the most effective
way of "immobilizing drug organizations [was] by removing their
financial resources ... incarceration of the highest level violators
alone was not substantially disruptive to many drug trafficking
organizations and an attack against their acquired assets was
11. Barry A.K. Rider, Fei Ch'ien Laundries: The Pursuit of Flying Money, 1992
J. INT'L PLAN. 77.
12. See Andrew Haynes, Money Laundering and Changes in International
Banking Regulation, 1993 J.I.B.L. 454.
13. Id.
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necessary."1 4  To an extent, however, there is a vicious circle in
this approach: stringent legislation enabling asset forfeiture merely
makes it necessary for the criminal to launder his money more
effectively (to hide those assets) which, in turn, requires further
anti-money laundering legislation.
Before considering the inherent dangers posed to financial
institutions by money laundering, it is helpful to explore the various
stages of a laundering transaction. While no two systems are the
same, there are recognized patterns in many of them comprised
under the following three headings:
Placement: the actual dispersal of illicitly earned cash into a
banking system;
Layering: separating the proceeds of the crime from their
source through complex, and often illusory, transactions
disguising the provenance of the funds;
Integration: the re-introduction of the proceeds into the
financial system as apparently normal and legitimate business
funds. 15
Financial intermediaries of some sort are nearly always necessary
for a successful laundering operation, and it is this aspect of
laundering that is now considered.
III. The Threat Posed to Financial Institutions by Money
Laundering
Be it a bank, accountant, solicitor, or insurer, inevitably a
financial intermediary of some sort will be required for a successful
money laundering operation. This being so, it is perhaps equally
inevitable that the authorities decide to lean on those organizations
so heavily involved in laundering, albeit often unwittingly, for their
cooperation. If all financial intermediaries are required to report
their suspicions, then the launderer will find his task that much
harder. London, of course, as one of the world's major financial
centers, has a special responsibility in this regard.
The other reason financial intermediaries are compelled by
legislation to cooperate with this process is that the authorities have
recognized that there are certain stages in a typical laundering
process that are more vulnerable to recognition. These stages are:
14. Id.
15. See JOINT MONEY LAUNDERING STEERING GROUP, GUIDANCE NOTES
FOR MAINSTREAM BANKING, LENDING AND DEPOSIT TAKING AcTIVITIES 8
(1993) [hereinafter GUIDANCE NOTES].
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(1) the entry of cash into the financial system; (2) cross-border
flows of cash; and (3) transfers within and from the financial
system.16  The metaphor of dropping a stone into a pool is
appropriate: when the dirty money is first deposited it creates a
noticeable ripple, but if unnoticed it may well remain undiscovered.
These stages necessarily involve the participation of banks or other
deposit-taking bodies, hence the importance of banks' vigilance in
detecting unusual transactions at the point at which the launderer
is most vulnerable to exposure.
Most financial intermediaries and their employees are honest.
However, a dishonest person who works for an organization
capable of laundering funds is easily corrupted:
Money laundering is now an extremely lucrative criminal
enterprise in its own right. The Treasury's investigations have
uncovered members of-an emerging criminal class - profession-
al money launderers who aid and abet other criminals through
financial activities. These individuals hardly fit the stereotype of
an underworld criminal. They are accountants, attorneys ...
and members of other legitimate professions. They need not
become involved with the underlying criminal activity except to
conceal and transfer the proceeds that result from it ... money
laundering, for them, is an easy route to almost limitless
wealth.17
Given that financial intermediaries are so crucial to a success-
ful laundering process, and also that the personal rewards of
laundering are so high, it is not surprising that such intermediaries
find themselves at risk of being tainted by the activities of a small
number of dishonest employees. It is obvious that the entire
finance industry is also tarnished by dubious banks and shell
companies that countries with lax legislation permit to be estab-
lished within their jurisdictions. Launderers gain apparent legitima-
cy by having as a "front" a bank or a firm of attorneys, and there
are several regimes prepared to tolerate such activity of dubious
legitimacy in return for the revenue that pours in.
With such simple ways of erecting a veil of legitimacy through
the incorporation of a laundering vehicle like a bank, it is easy to
see the pervasive cancer of fraud that threatens to sweep through
16. Id.
17. U.S. Senate Committee on Government Affairs, 1985, reprinted in ROWAN
BoswoRTH-DAVIES & GRAHAM SALTMARSH, MONEY LAUNDERING: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE NEW LEGISLATION 53 (Chapman & Hall, 1994)
[hereinafter BOSWORTH-DAVIES & SALTMARSH].
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the financial services industry. It is a mistake to assume that it is
only banks that are at risk: solicitors and accountants are accus-
tomed to performing a wide array of services for their clients, and
many of these could be used for the purposes of laundering money.
One commentator has gone so far as to say:
solicitors probably contributed the greatest degree of profes-
sional support and facilitation to the activities of the launderers
... such professionals would create offshore companies; arrange
for the handling of large sums of money; sign cheques with a
power of attorney; and give instructions to third parties; all the
while protected behind the cloak of legal privilege. 8
The advantages for launderers of using professionals bound to
respect the confidentiality of their dealings with clients is obvious.
It can be very difficult to break the privilege that attaches to
lawyer-client relationships, especially bearing in mind how jealously
guarded this privilege is: The Law Society when initially comment-
ing on the new legislation considered it "repugnant to the law-
yer/client relationship."' 9
It is because of the inherent dangers to the financial services
industry that the European Commission has targeted that very
industry which is so much at risk, as the preamble to its Directive
makes clear, "[W]hen credit and financial institutions are used to
launder proceeds from criminal activities ... the soundness and
stability of the institution concerned and confidence in the financial
system as a whole could be seriously jeopardized, thereby losing the
trust of the public."'  The Criminal Justice Act 1993 and the
Money Laundering Regulations 1993 were promulgated to give
effect to the Directive, and it is to this legislation that this Article
now turns.
IV. The Criminal Justice Act 1993, The Proceeds of Crime Act
1995, and Other Recent English Anti-Money Laundering
Legislation
It is now necessary to consider the new statutory responsibili-
ties faced by financial institutions. In addition to the CJA 1993, the
18. BOswORTH-DAVIES & SALTMARSH, supra note 17, at 73.
19. See Stephen Solley & Christopher Quinn, Too Cosy with the Client, TIMES
(London), Feb. 22, 1994, at features.
20. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 4, at pmbl.
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offenses are contained in several other Acts.21 The nature of this
Article does not permit an exhaustive examination of every
offense;22 instead, the provisions of most concern to financial
intermediaries are considered.
A. Section 22(1), Theft Act 19682
Parliament has long realized that there should be criminal
penalties for those who facilitate the realization of stolen property.
Accordingly, section 22(1) of the Theft Act 1968 provides that
someone is guilty of handling stolen goods if he "dishonestly
undertakes or assists in their retention, removal, disposal or
realisation, by or for the benefit of another person."'24 This is a
wide-ranging provision, and was successfully used to prosecute
those who were chiefly responsible for laundering the proceeds of
the Brinks Mat robbery. However, it is restricted to the han-
dling of goods which are, or which represent, stolen property.
26
This major limitation on its scope led to the introduction of further
legislation in the 1980s and 1990s.
B. The Proceeds of Crime Act 1995
The remaining legislation discussed in this section highlights
those provisions intended to criminalize the activities of those who
assist in money laundering. Interestingly, however, the most recent
legislation bolsters the law not against those who assist in launder-
ing; rather, it continues the theory that asset forfeiture is an
essential weapon in fighting financial crime.
The early 1990s saw a major overhaul of anti-laundering
legislation. In 1995 there were new provisions aimed at those
benefitting from the laundering, rather than the launderers
themselves.27 While not of direct relevance to financial intermedi-
aries, the Proceeds of Crime 1995 Act (the Act) is nonetheless
included here as the most recent example of the Government's
21. For a comprehensive list, see Leonard Jason-Lloyd, Money Laundering -
the complete guide, NEW L.J., Feb. 3, 1995, at 150.
22. Id.
23. Theft Act 1968, § 22(1) (Eng.).
24. Id.
25. BoswoRTH-DAVIES & SALTMARSH, supra note 17, at 108. The analysis
here of the new legislation owes much to that contained in this guide.
26. Theft Act, supra note 23, § 22(1).
27. The Crime Act, supra note 1.
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determination to continue to combat money laundering, this time
by confiscating the end-product.
The courts for several years have had the power to order that
the proceeds of crime be confiscated following conviction.' This
power has been infrequently used. The Act broadens the powers
of the court to make a confiscation order; more importantly, it
makes it the duty of the court to make such an order in certain
circumstances.
29
Section 1 of the Act makes it the court's duty to confiscate the
proceeds of a crime in every case in which written notice has been
given by the prosecutor. ° This applies to all indictable offenses
and a limited number of summary ones. 31 Section 2 enables the
court to make two assumptions about a defendant: first, that all
property held by him on conviction is the proceeds of criminal
activity;32 secondly, that any property passing through his hands
in the six years prior to the proceedings also represents the
proceeds of criminal activity.33 There is a (limited) safeguard for
the defendant that the court can only make such an assumption
where the prosecutor has given written notice that such an
assumption is appropriate.34 The defendant must also have shown
a "pattern" of offending by previous similar convictions.3"
The strength of these provisions lies in that they are mandato-
ry, and will apply whenever a defendant has benefitted financially
from his activity.36 It will be interesting to chart the Act's useful-
ness over the coming years.
Another startling part of the Act is the ability of the court to
demand information ascertaining the level of benefit derived from
the criminal activity.37 Not only can the defendant be required to
disclose such information (facing further proceedings for contempt
of court if he refuses); under section 11 the police can apply to a
Circuit Judge for an order to permit the obtaining of material
possessed by any institution which may be relevant. s Thus a
28. See, e.g., Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1988; Criminal Justice Act, supra
note 10.
29. The Crime Act, supra note 1, § 1.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 2.
33. Id.
34. The Crime Act, supra note 1, § 3.
35. Id. § 1.
36. Id. § lA.
37. Id. § 11.
38. Id.
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bank may be required to disclose statements. A later section
ensures government departments responsibility to disclose such
information if asked.
Such asset forfeiture provisions though, are not enough. It is
necessary to target in addition those who assist in the laundering.
This section now turns specifically to those provisions.
C. The Drug Trafficking Act 199440
The Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (DTA 1994), which came into
effect February 3, 1995, consolidates the Drug Trafficking Offences
Act 1986.41 The crucial section for financial institutions to note is
section 50 of DTA 1994, which creates the offense of assisting
another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking.42  Anyone
entering into an arrangement with another to facilitate an other's
retention of drug proceeds, and who knows or suspects that the
other is someone benefitting from drug trafficking, is guilty of an
offense.43
Thus, any intermediary entering into transactions on behalf of
a client suspecting that the relevant funds are the proceeds of drugs
trafficking, faces criminal liability, an unlimited fine, and fourteen
years in prison.44 It is sufficient for the offense that the person
assisted received payment in respect to a third party's trafficking:
he need not have been directly involved himself. 45 It is a defense
that the potential assistor disclosed his/its suspicion to a consta-
ble.46
D. Section 11, Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act of 1989 (POTA 1989)
The wording of this offense is similar to section 50, DTA 1994,
but relates to financial assistance to terrorist organizations.47 In
addition, it should be noted that, as with drug money, it is an
offense not to disclose a suspicion of financial assistance of
39. The Crime Act, supra note 1, § 13.
40. Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (Eng.).
41. Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 (Eng.).
42. See id. § 50.
43. Id. § 51.
44. Id. § 54..
45. Id. § 51.
46. Id. § 52(1)(c).
47. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (Eng.)
[hereinafter POTA 1989].
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terrorism. The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act
1991 also introduces various money laundering offenses. 49 These
are very similar in scope to those contained in the anti-drug
trafficking legislation and the CJA 1993, but relate to assisting
proscribed organizations in Northern Ireland. °
E. Developing the Legislation in the 1990s
In 1989, the Home Affairs Committee of the House of
Commons undertook a review of the Drug Trafficking Offences
Act 1986, reporting in November of that year. The National Drugs
Intelligence Co-ordinator estimated that there was at least £1800
million derived from drug trafficking in the financial systems within
the United Kingdom."1 This concerned the Committee, as did the
view expressed in the United States that Britain was fast becoming
home to an offshore banking system for drug money laundering. 2
The Committee's Report recognized the threat posed to the
financial services industry by money laundering, and recognized,
too, that action was necessary:
We recommend that the Government should instruct the Bank
of England, as a matter of urgency, to examine the scale of the
threat to the banking community posed by money laundering
and any legislative or other changes required to counter it....
The Government should then come forward with the necessary
amending legislation as a matter of priority.5 3
There was also global action, notably the creation by the G7
countries54 of the Financial Action Task Force, to tackle money
laundering. The separate activities in so many countries led in 1991
to the European Council's Directive "on the prevention of the use
of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering."55
It was to implement the United Kingdom's obligations regarding
the Directive that the Criminal Justice Act 19936 and the Money
Laundering Regulations 1993 were passed. 7 The Directive has
48. Id. § 18(a).
49. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 (Eng.).
50. Id.
51. BoswoRTH-DAVIES & SALTMARSH, supra note 17, at 116.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 119.
54. The Group of Seven (now Eight) Economic/Industrialized Nations.
55. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 4, at pmbl.
56. Criminal Justice Act, supra note 2.
57. Money Laundering Regulations 1993 (Eng.).
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been described as the "most demanding initiatives yet proposed by
any legislative body to combat the phenomenon of 'funny mon-
ey."'' 58  Certainly the CJA 1993 radically extends the criminal
sanctions available against those involved in money laundering.
F The Criminal Justice Act of 1993
The CJA 1993 provisions add to existing statutes: its most
noticeable additions are to what is now the Drug Trafficking Act
1994"9 and the Criminal Justice Act 1988.60
1. Section 51, Drug Trafficking Act 199461- This creates
the offense of knowingly acquiring or possessing property derived
from drug trafficking. The aim of the section is to make it difficult
for traffickers to pass on their trafficking-derived property to be
held by third parties. Crucially for financial intermediaries and
professional advisers, subsection (6) defines "possession" of
property as "doing any act in relation to it." Thus criminal liability
is not restricted to those who assist in a positive way, but extends
to anyone who knows that a particular client is a drug trafficker
and acquires or uses property which represents the proceeds of
trafficking. It is also important to note that while it is a defense to
show that one has given adequate consideration for the property
62
subsection (4) excludes the provision of services which are of
assistance in the drug trafficking from the definition of "adequate
consideration."'  This provision, therefore, catches the profession-
al knowingly laundering drug money if he is paid for his services,
because the money used for payment will "indirectly represent the
proceeds of drug trafficking"' as required by the section.
2. Section 52, Drug Trafficking Act 199465- This section
includes arguably the most draconian piece of the new legislation,
and the relevant provisions are therefore laid out in full:
52 (1) A person is guilty of an offence if:
58. BoswoRTH-DAVIES & SALTMARSH, supra note 17, at 119.
59. Drug Trafficking Act, supra note 40.
60. Criminal Justice Act, supra note 10.
61. Drug Trafficking Act, supra note 40, § 51.
62. See id. § 51(2).
63. Id. § 51(4).
64. Id.
65. Drug Trafficking Act 1994, § 52 (Eng.).
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(a) he knows or suspects that another person is engaged in
drug money laundering;
(b) the information ... on which that knowledge or
suspicion is based came to his knowledge in the course
trade, profession, business or employment; and
(c) he does not disclose the information.., to a constable
as soon as is reasonably practicable after it comes to his
attention.6 6
The offense is punishable with up to five years imprisonment.67
Technically, the offense relates only to knowledge or suspicion of
drug money laundering. Nonetheless, it imposes a serious burden
on the financial sector to ensure that it has compliance systems in
place, and to report any suspicions that it might have. The
ramifications of this offence are considered further below,6" but
even at first glance the gravity of its implications are apparent.
Merely to suspect that another is involved in drug money launder-
ing, and not to disclose one's suspicions, amounts to an offense if
those suspicions are acquired in the workplace.69
There is a defense7" that the person concerned reported his
suspicion to another authorized by the company to be the "report-
ing" or "compliance" officer.7' In practice, this "reporting up the
line" will be the usual way to comply with the legislation, rather
than the employee directly informing the police. While this eases
the burden for individual employees, it places an onerous level of
responsibility on the reporting officer. If he fails to act on the
information as soon as is reasonably practical he commits the
offense himself. Regarding solicitors' firms, although there is a
defense that the information is subject to legal privilege,72 this is
defined by reference to section 10 of the Police and Criminal
Justice Act 1984, and has been interpreted very narrowly.
73
66. Id.
67. Id. § 52.
68. See discussion infra part IV.F.3.
69. See generally Drug Trafficking Act, supra note 40.
70. Id. § 52.
71. Id.
72. See id. § 52(2).
73. See R. v. Central Criminal Court, ex parte Francis & Francis [1989] 1 A.C.
346. See also Police and Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Eng.).
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3. Section 53, Drug Trafficking Act 199474-- This section
creates an offense of tipping-off someone who knows or suspects
that the police are conducting an investigation into drug money
laundering and discloses to any other person information which is
likely to prejudice the investigation.75 This wide-ranging provi-
sion, again, poses risks to financial intermediaries, in particular,
those who are concerned at the dangers of civil liability and who
wish to approach the court for directions under the principle laid
down in Finers (a firm) v. Miro.76 It remains to be seen how
effective the derided system of the "Chinese Wall" is in large
financial conglomerates. It is easy to imagine circumstances in
which one department is co-operating with the police in their
inquiries while accidental disclosure of that fact to another
department would prejudice the investigation and result in the
commission of an offense under this section.
4. Section 93A, Criminal Justice Act 198877- This provi-
sion is intended to fulfill the requirement in article 1 of the
Directive that legislation should prevent the laundering of the
proceeds of any criminal conduct.7" Anyone concerned with an
arrangement facilitating the disposal, investment, or transfer of the
proceeds of criminal conduct on behalf of another, knowing, or
suspecting that that other has benefited from criminal conduct, is
guilty of an offense.79 There is the usual defense of disclosure to
a constable.8'
Again, this is a wide-ranging provision. It has, somehow(!),
been calculated that "it is theoretically possible to commit an
offence under section 93A in 216 different ways."8" Its scope is
considered further below.
5. Section 93B, Criminal Justice Act 1988L- This creates
the offense of acquisition, possession, or use of the proceeds of
74. Drug Trafficking Act, supra note 40, § 53.
75. Id.
76. [1991] 1 W.L.R. 35 (C.A.).
77. Criminal Justice Act, supra note 10, § 93A.
78. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 4, art. 1.
79. Id.
80. Id. art. 1.3.
81. BOSWORTH-DAVIES & SALTMARSH, supra note 17, at 128.
82. Criminal Justice Act, supra note 10, § 93B.
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criminal conduct.8 3 It is otherwise identical to section 51 of the
DTA 1994.84
6. Section 93C, Criminal Justice Act 198885- This provi-
sion is designed to punish anyone who assists in hiding property
from the English courts, or removing it from the jurisdiction.86 It
extends to any action designed to disguise or remove evidence, or
to remove assets which forms the subject of a confiscation order.'
Critically, the mens rea for this offense includes the objective
element of "knowing or having reasonable grounds to suspect.,
88
This is important for intermediaries: even if they did not actually
know or suspect that they were assisting in the transfer of money
that was "dirty," the Court may infer that reasonable grounds for
suspicion existed, and sentence them to fourteen years in prison.
Intermediaries are, thus, placed under a positive duty to consider
the probability of the dealings of their clients, the nature of the
transactions and whether they form part of a meaningful commer-
cial relationship, or whether they are in fact an elaborate way of
secreting illicitly-earned funds outside the jurisdiction. It is
suggested that failure to make such inquiries could in future entail
criminal liability if the circumstances were sufficient to satisfy the
objective mens rea criterion.
As a result, the significance of this section should not be
under-estimated. If used by the authorities to its full potential,
section 93C should swiftly end the "Nelsonian" blindness so
willingly displayed by many professional advisers in previous years
in, for instance, setting up off-shore companies. The section also
criminalizes bank employees who help in the transfer of assets, if
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that their provenance was
illicit.
89
There is a defense that disclosure was made to the police,
either in advance of the transaction and that it took place with
police consent, or that disclosure was made as soon as was
reasonably practicable after the transaction.9 If there is a reason-
83. Id.
84. Drug Trafficking Act, supra note 40, § 51.




89. Id. § 93C.
90. Id.
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able excuse why disclosure was not made as soon as reasonably
practicable, then again there is a defense.91
7. Section 93D, Criminal Justice Act 198892- This section
mirrors section 53, DTA 1994, creating an offense of tipping-off,
but extending its scope beyond drug money laundering to cover the
proceeds of any criminal conduct. 93 Informing anyone other than
the proper authorities or the Reporting Officer of a suspicion of
laundering is an offense if it is likely to prejudice a present or
future investigation.94
G. The Money Laundering Regulations 1993 (The Regula-
tions)
95
The Regulations were designed to ensure that financial
institutions have systems in place to combat money laundering.
The Regulations require that anyone conducting "relevant financial
business '  puts in place internal procedures through which
laundering can be prevented.97 These procedures can be summa-
rized as follows:
- identifying anyone with whom a financial business is forming
a "business relationship";
- keeping records for five years of all transactions and a copy
of the evidence that was produced to satisfy proof of identity;
- putting in place an internal reporting structure so that
anyone with a suspicion of laundering can make a report to a
designated officer of the company, ensuring that the designated
officer has access to any records that will enable him to decide
whether to report a suspicion to the National Criminal Intelli-
gence Service;
- training staff to recognise money laundering and to be aware
of their duties under the legislation, including the procedures
put in place in compliance with the Regulations.98
91. Id.
92. Criminal Justice Act, supra note 10, § 93D.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Money Laundering Regulation 1993 (Eng.) [hereinafter The Regulations].
96. As widely defined by Reg. 4, and including "investment business" within
the meaning of the Financial Services Act 1986 (Eng.). See The Regulations,
supra note 95, § 4.
97. The Regulations, supra note 95.
98. Id.
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The new duties placed on financial institutions are onerous and
were greeted with dismay in many quarters of the City of Lon-
don.99 Merely failing to put in place adequate staff training is now
an offense, punishable with two years imprisonment."° Indeed,
the philosophy behind the Regulations has been described as
"[a]ssist the authorities or face prison."1 °1 Regardless of the cost
to financial institutions of compliance,"° the thought of directors
of a High Street bank being jailed because they failed to train their
staff to spot money launderers is a novel one.
If the institution is unable to identify a client within a
reasonable period, there is a strict requirement that the transaction
does not proceed. This is at odds with article seven of the EC
Directive, which provides that financial institutions should carry out
a transaction without informing the police, if failure to proceed
with it is likely to arouse suspicion and frustrate a subsequent
investigation. 3 Institutions are in a dilemma: if they inform the
police they risk prejudicing an investigation if delay creates
suspicion. It is suggested that institutions report their suspicions
anyway: article seven is not mirrored in the domestic legislation,
and it may be difficult for the institution concerned to show the
police why it did not make immediate disclosure, attracting liability
under section 52, DTA 1994.
It is not just the specter of criminal liability, though, that
should haunt financial intermediaries following the CJA 1993 and
the Regulations. While it is perfectly understandable that such
bodies should do all in their power to comply with the new
legislation, it is vital that they remain alert to the abyss into which
they may fall if they forget the dangers of civil liability: construc-
tive trusteeship.
V. The Dangers of Civil Liability
Intermediaries are today caught on all sides: a rapidly develop-
ing but uncertain civil law obligation, labelled constructive
99. See Roger Fink, UK Bankers Right to Worry about Directive, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1994, at 16.
100. The Regulations, supra note 95, § 5.
101. Robert Finney, UK Money Laundering Laws after the Reforms of 1993,
[1993] B.J.B.L. 530, 534.
102. Estimated by HM Treasury at £230,000 starting-up costs for a large Unit
Trust company, and then £150,000 pa.
103. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 4, art. 7.
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trusteeship, on one side and a plethora of wholly new criminal
penalties on the other."°4
The philosophy behind the new legislation mirrors that
prevalent in securities regulation for years: "Know Your Client."
The concept of Due Diligence is hardly a new one, yet the
provisions of the CJA 1993 return it to the forefront and again
raise the issue of the uneasy relationship between civil and criminal
liability. The new legislation may appear to be well conceived
when viewed in isolation on the statute book; however, an
examination of the civil liabilities facing intermediaries reveals,
perhaps, the reverse.
The essential problem is this: compliance with the criminal
legislation exposes an intermediary to a greater risk of civil liability.
The underlying principle is well-established from cases such as
Barnes v. Addy1 5 and Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v.
Cradock (a bankrupt) (No. 3). °6 If X receives property that he
knows is transferred to him in breach of trust, then he receives it
qua constructive trustee, but, crucially for financial intermediaries,
liability is not confined to "knowing receipt." Such an institution
can also be fixed with liability if it knowingly assists in a breach of
trust, as Barnes v. Addy itself shows. 7
To the layperson, such an observation should not concern the
honest intermediary, who could not possibly knowingly become
involved in a commercial fraud. To the lawyer, however, it is the
vexed question of what constitutes "knowledge" that has caused so
much concern. The recent decision of the Privy Council in Royal
Brunei Airlines v. Tan,108 with its emphasis on dishonesty rather
than knowledge as the key to liability, is to be welcomed.
Nonetheless, the parameters of liability here are far from certain;
while this makes it difficult to assert that a fixed level of knowledge
will undoubtedly entail liability, it is submitted that the surrounding
uncertainty only makes it more difficult for intermediaries to
ascertain exactly where the risks lie.
This section begins by attempting to reach some tentative
conclusions as to what level of knowledge is required to fix an
institution with potential liability. It then looks at the Regulations,
and at the Guidance Notes issued by the Joint Money Laundering
104. Editorial, 1 J. INT'L PLAN. 55 (1992).
105. [1874] 9 Ch. App. 244.
106. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555.
107. [1874] 9 Ch. App. 244.
108. Royal Brunei Airlines, [19951 2 A.C. 378.
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Steering Group, and describes how much institutions are expected
to find out about their clients. Then follows a comparison of the
two: if, a bank or a firm of solicitors has, in its possession, the
information about its client's activities required of it by the
Regulations, the bank or firm assists its client in those activities,
and it emerges that those activities may involve a breach of trust,
will the bank or firm be in possession of sufficient information to
be liable as a constructive trustee?
Actions seeking to impose constructive trust liability are on the
rise.1  The Chancery Division now constantly faces claims by
liquidators and administrators to impose liability on directors and
financial institutions allegedly involved in a breach of duty. Since
1989, in addition to the claims against'the banks involved in the
Barlow Clowes, Polly Peck and Maxwell scandals, there have been
those against chartered accountants1  and brokers."' It has
been observed that the new activism by the courts, in using the
constructive trust as a tool of asset recovery, marks a significant
addition to the legal armoury against fraudsters and money
launderers."2  While this is, of course, correct, typically the
principal defendant who has initiated the fraud will not have
sufficient assets at his disposal to meet any substantial order made
against him. As a result, as Sir John Mummery pointed out,
13
the administrators or liquidators turn instead to a financial
institution, allegedly involved in the breach of duty, that will be
able to meet a claim if found liable."1 The dangers are particu-
larly potent if the money has been successfully laundered, because
the proprietary remedy of tracing is unavailable to the plaintiff.
The only course of action for recovery of funds is thus to seek to
make someone personally liable, with the knowing assistant being
the obvious candidate. The dangers of a financial intermediary
being joined as a defendant are thus very real, even if its conduct
has been simply to "ask no questions" and otherwise falls short of
being morally reprehensible. To most, this conduct seems dishon-
est in itself. It should be noted, though, that large areas of the
banking industry and other financial intermediaries have until
109. Sir John Mummery, Liability for Involvement in a Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, 1 J. INT'L PLAN. 57, 66 (1992).
110. Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson, [1990] Ch. 265.
111. Eagle Trust plc. v. S.B.C. Securities Ltd., [1992] 4 All E.R. 488.
112. See, e.g., Ben Strong, Civil Asset Recovery Procedures: How Equity deters
Fraud, 13 COMPANY LAW. 44 (1992).
113. See Mummery, supra note 109.
114. Id.
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recently flourished largely by adopting this approach. The
"discreet" (as they would no doubt term it) service offered by
many banks is very much at odds with the current judicial willing-
ness to impose accessory liability.
A. The Level of Knowledge Required for the Imposition of
Constructive Trusteeship
The question of the level of knowledge required to become
fixed with liability qua constructive trustee is a vexed one, and
there is uncertainty surrounding the conflicting dicta emerging from
the courts in recent years. It is an established principle of equity
that, where a person knowingly participates in another's breach of
trust, he will be regarded as standing in the same place as the
trustee."5 The position has been summed up as follows by Snell's
Principles of Equity:"6
[Strangers to a trust will be liable] if they assist with knowledge
in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees.
The requisite knowledge has been described as knowledge of
circumstances which would indicate to an honest, reasonable
man that such a design was being committed or would put him
on inquiry, which the stranger failed to make, whether it was
being committed.117
While this is a useful summary, it is necessary to consider the
recent cases in more detail, and to look in particular at the decision
of Mr. Justice Millett in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v Jackson"18 and of
- the Privy Council in Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan."9
In Agip, the oil company, Agip, had employed a dishonest
accountant, Zdiri.1'2 Zdiri was suborned into joining a Parisian
crime syndicate, one member of whom was a French lawyer, C.'
C approached Jackson, an accountant on The Isle of Man, who, on
C's behalf, created various companies on The Isle of Man and
opened various bank accounts in England."2 Zdiri then misap-
propriated large sums of money from Agip, which were promptly
115. Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock (a bankrupt) (no.3),
[1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555.
116. E. SNELL, PRINCIPLES OF EQUrrY (28 ed. 1982).
117. Id. at 192.
118. [1990] Ch. 265.
119. [1995] 2 A.C. 378.
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laundered through The Isle of Man companies and London
accounts created by Jackson, and disappeared."u Agip brought
an action against Jackson, claiming, inter alia, that he had knowing-
ly assisted in a fraudulent breach of trust.124 No proprietary claim
lay against him as a trustee in the strict sense of the word, rather
it was asserted by Agip that he should be personally liable to make
restitution as if he were a trustee, since he was "guilty of wilful and
reckless failure to make the inquiries which honest men would have
made in. order to satisfy themselves that they were not acting in
furtherance of the fraud." '
The question arising before Mr. Justice Millett, at first instance
dealt with the state of knowledge required for such liability to be
imposed. 6 The learned judge confirmed that to be liable as a
constructive trustee for "knowing receipt," constructive notice of
the breach of trust sufficed.1" This, however, was a case concern-
ing "knowing assistance," and different criteria were applicable.1"
To render a stranger to the trust liable for "knowing assistance,"
the breach of trust had to be a fraudulent one.129 Logically,
therefore, constructive notice on the part of the stranger could not
make him liable, because it would be ludicrous to conclude that the
principal had to be fraudulent to incur liability, while the assistant
could be liable simply for negligence, "Dishonest furtherance of the
dishonest scheme of another is an understandable basis for liability;
negligent but honest failure to appreciate that someone else's
scheme is dishonest is not. . . The true distinction is between
honesty and dishonesty."3 ' This criterion for liability avoided
difficult distinctions between different shades of knowledge.
Mr. Justice Millett continued by considering what amounted to
dishonesty:
If a man does not draw the obvious inference or make the
obvious inquiries, the question is, why not? If it is because,
however foolishly, he did not suspect wrongdoing or, having
suspected it, had his suspicions allayed, however unreasonably,
that is one thing. But if he did suspect wrongdoing yet failed
123. Id.
124. Id.




129. This has recently been doubted by the Privy Council in Royal Brunei
Airlines v. Tan, [1995] 2 A.C. 378.
130. Agip, [1990] Ch. at 292.
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to make inquiries because he "did not want to know" or
because he regarded it as "none of his business," that is quite
another. Such conduct is dishonest, and those who are guilty of
it cannot complain if, for the purpose of civil liability, they are
treated as if they had actual knowledge.'
The last nine words reveal that while Mr. Justice Milett
claimed constructive knowledge was insufficient for the imposition
of liability, he was prepared to treat the defendants "as if they had
actual knowledge," that for example, they were liable -even though
they did not have actual knowledge because they had failed "to
draw the obvious inference."' It is submitted that the line
between this and constructive knowledge is an extremely fine one.
Although the distinction between honesty and dishonesty as being
the test for liability should be welcomed, avoiding as it does the
difficulties of classifying different degrees of knowledge faced by
Judge Peter Gibson in Baden, Delvaux and Lecuit v. Societe
Generale S.A.,' it still requires some difficult inferences to be
drawn. Its application has recently been confirmed by the decision
of the Privy Council in Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan."M
Mr. Justice Millett concluded with remarks that must have
caused many financial intermediaries to ponder the implications of
his judgment with considerable care:
Secrecy is the badge of fraud.... It is not necessary that [the
stranger to the trust] should have been aware of the precise
nature of the fraud or even of the identity of the victim. A man
who consciously assists others by making arrangements which
he knows are calculated to conceal what is happening from a
third party, takes the risk that they are part of a fraud practised
on that party .... [The defendants] made no inquiries of the
plaintiffs because they thought that it was none of their
business. That is not honest behaviour. The sooner that those
who provide the services of nominee companies for the purpose
of enabling their clients to keep their activities secret realise it,
the better. In my judgment, it is quite enough to make them
liable to account as constructive trustees.'35
131. Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. [1983] B.C.L.C. 325.
134. [1995] 2 A.C. 378.
135. Agip, [1990] Ch. at 294.
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It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal 136 did not com-
ment on these observations, even though it reached the same
conclusions as Mr. Justice Millett. It is also unfortunate that Lord
Justice Fox of that court muddied the waters by apparently
contradicting Millett over the criterion for liability. Lord Justice
Fox held that liability flowed not from dishonesty but from the
degree of knowledge set out by Mr. Justice Ungoed-Thomas in
Selangor United Rubber Estates v. Cradock,137 namely knowledge
of circumstances which would put on inquiry an honest and reason-
able man.138 The decision of Mr. Justice Vinelott in Eagle Trust
plc v. SBC Securities Ltd.,139 however, has plastered over this gap,
taking it as settled law that the test is one of honesty or lack
thereof.
In Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan," the airline had appointed
a travel agent to act as its general agent for the sale of passenger
and cargo transportation.' The agent was required to account
to the airline for all amounts received from such sales, and it was
a trustee for the airline of the money.42 The money, however,
was paid into the agent's current account and used for the agent's
other business purposes.43 The defendant, Tan, was the manag-
ing director and principal shareholder of the travel agent, which
became unable to pay the airline the sums owed.'" The airline
relied on liability for "knowing assistance" in bringing an action in
equity against the defendant.145
Lord Nicholls, giving the judgment of the Privy Council, held
that the touchstone of liability was dishonesty."4  This meant
simply not acting as an honest person would in the circumstances,
and that was an objective standard. However, honesty had a strong
subjective standard, because it described a type of conduct assessed
in the light of what a person actually knew at the time. This
definition of honesty reinforces the author's view that it is impossi-
ble to divorce the concepts of knowledge and honesty, however
136. Agip (Africa) Ltd v. Jackson, [1991] Ch. 547.
137. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555.
138. Id.
139. [1991] B.C.L.C. 438.
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146. Id.
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much the Privy Council seeks to move away from the former and
towards the latter in its attempt to form the basis of liability. His
Lordship said, in words that will go some way to assuage the fears
of intermediaries, that carelessness was not dishonesty, which "for
the most part" was to be equated with "conscious impropriety."147
But the learned judge went on to state that an honest person did
not deliberately close his eyes and ears, or deliberately not ask
questions, lest he learned something he would rather not know, and
then proceed regardless.1" Furthermore, Lord Nicholls clearly
had little time for those who argue that in many commercial
situations that it can be difficult to ascertain the nature of the
transaction, opining that an honest person should have little
difficulty in knowing whether a proposed transaction, or his
participation in it, would offend the normally accepted standards of
honest conduct, "The individual is expected to attain the standard
which would be observed by an honest person placed in those
circumstances. It is impossible to be more specific.""1 9  His
Lordship went on to say that the courts should move away from
trying to define different shades of "knowledge." Knowingly was
inept as a criterion when applied to the gradually darkening
spectrum where the differences were of degree and not kind. is
However, knowledge and honesty are clearly inextricably
linked or else there would be no danger to banks from finding out
too much about their clients. The better view is that constructive
knowledge is insufficient, but that actual knowledge of the fraud,
and therefore dishonesty, can be imputed where the defendant
failed to draw the obvious inferences from the circumstances, knew
facts which would have put an honest and reasonable person on
notice, and yet proceeded regardless. What is initially startling
about Agip is that the defendant accountants, who had, at all times,
acted in accordance with their clients' instructions and with no
actual knowledge of any fraud, were made personally liable to
account for $518,823.5' The case shows how adept equity has
become at adapting the ancient concept of the trust to combat
modern multi-jurisdictional fraud, and in this instance, to imposing
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Although dishonesty is now seen as the key to liability, so that
the dangers to essentially honest intermediaries seem to be
receding, the position is still uncertain and the tenor of the Millett
judgment in Agip demonstrates that the courts take a dim view of
institutions who thrive on the confidentiality of their services. The
blameworthiness of Mr. Jackson is not a relevant issue here.
15 2
The Millett decision is discussed here only to highlight the dangers
to financial intermediaries of becoming involved in laundering the
proceeds of fraud, and of learning too much about their clients'
transactions.
The Money Laundering Regulations require institutions to
gather increasing amounts of material about their clients in order
to protect themselves from criminal liability, and yet the presence
of such material means that they are left being forced to guarantee
the integrity of every transaction with which they are involved, or
face the consequences if any transaction turns out to be tarnished
by fraud. Such bodies cannot deliberately resist finding out too
much since even the omission to collate information is now an
offense.153
Another case that raises similar specters to haunt financial
intermediaries is Finers (a firm) v. Miro.5 4 A firm of London
solicitors acted on behalf of an American client and invested in
various offshore trusts in the Caribbean. 55 One of the firm's
partners overheard remarks about this client, as a result he grew
suspicious that the money the firm was being asked to invest
represented the proceeds of fraud.'56 He, therefore, applied to
the court under R.S.C. Order 85157 for directions in respect of the
funds. He feared that if he continued to follow his client's
instructions, his firm risked exactly the same liability as that
imposed on Mr. Jackson in Agip'58 There was a dilemma,
though, for, on the other hand if he ignored his client's instructions,
he risked a personal claim against him by the client for breach of
legal privilege and confidentiality.159
152. Although it seems possible that today he would be guilty of an offense
under section 93C, Criminal Justice Act, supra note 10.
153. See The Regulations, supra note 95, § 5.
154. [1991] 1 W.L.R. 35 (C.A.).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. SuP. Cr. R. ORD. 85 (ENG.).
158. See Finers, [1991] 1 W.L.R. 35.
159. Several other claims could also arise for refusing to carry out the client's
instructions and these are discussed further below, infra part V.C.
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The Court of Appeal held that the prima facie case of fraud
removed the client's claim to legal privilege: "fraud unravels all
obligations of confidence."1" This principle is well-established,
and dates from 1856, when the Court of Appeal held in Gartside v.
Oughtram16 1 that "there is no confidence as to the disclosure of
iniquity."'62  The Court went further, however. Not only was
Finers released from its duties of confidentiality to its former client,
it was placed under a positive duty to advise potential victims of
the fraud of its suspicions." 6 As soon as the firm was aware of
the possibility of fraud, if it wished to ensure freedom from
constructive trustee liability, it had to search for those who may
have had a claim and advise them accordingly.1
64
On its facts, a neat and satisfactory conclusion may have been
reached in this case; the ramifications of their Lordships' decision,
however, further increase the pressures on financial intermediaries.
It is unfortunate that the Court did not see fit to give the reasoning
behind its ruling, Lord Justice Balcombe contented himself with the
observation that:
Without going into detail, it seems to me that the evidence here
presented on behalf of the plaintiffs is such that it is entirely
right that the plaintiffs should be directed to tell the liquidator
of the existence of these proceedings so that he may decide
whether he wishes to make any claim to those assets, or, if
appropriate, against the plaintiffs themselves.16
Given the importance of his decision, it seems surprising that the
detailed reasoning was excluded.
If the Regulations do require a sufficiently high amount of
information about a client for the intermediary to be put on inquiry
for the purpose of constructive trust liability, then the decision of
the court in Finers means that the intermediary will also be
required to seek potential victims of the breach, and face the risk
of huge claims if it does not. If it grows suspicious, and makes a
report under the Regulations, the fact that it felt compelled to
make a report may mean that it is also obliged to seek the court's
directions on informing would-be victims, or face the consequences.
160. Finers, [1991] 1 W.L.R. 35, (Balcombe, L.J.)
161. (1856) 26 LJ. Ch. 113.
162. Id. at 114.
163. Finers, [1991] 1 W.L.R. at 35, 47.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 46.
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B. The Level of Knowledge Required by the Money Laundering
Regulations 1993
This, of course, is mere speculation unless the Regulations do,
in fact, require enough information to be gathered to fix the
intermediary with potential civil liability. The question of what the
responsibility of an intermediary is when accepting a client's funds
or assisting him in a transaction was considered above. The related
questions of what an intermediary should find out about its client's
affairs, and when it is proper for the intermediary to divulge what
he knows, must now be discussed.
The ambit of the Regulations has already been mentioned.1"
What is at issue here is what, in practice, will be demanded of
financial institutions in the way of additional knowledge about their
clients. As a result, the Guidance Notes issued by the Joint Money
Laundering Steering Group are considered as well as the Regula-
tions themselves, because by Regulation 5(3), "In determining
whether a person has complied with any of the requirements [of
the Regulations], a court may take account of ... any relevant
supervisory or regulatory guidance which applies to that per-
son."
, 167
As previously noted, there are four primary obligations
imposed on institutions by the Regulations. In the context of
knowledge sufficient to create a danger of constructive trust
liability, the particularly relevant regulations will be those pertain-
ing to identification.1' 6 The philosophy behind the identification
provisions lies at the center of the Regulations. Given that the
purpose of laundering dirty money is to conceal not only the source
but also the ownership of the proceeds of crime, the ability to
identify exactly with whom one is transacting is crucial if laundering
is to be successfully combated. As a result, Regulation 7 provides
that if an institution cannot obtain satisfactory evidence of a new
client's identity, it may not proceed further with a transaction.169
One provision, particularly interesting in the present discus-
sion, is the identification procedures required for transactions on
behalf of a third party.7 Crucially, the frequency with which
166. See supra part IV.G.
167. The Regulations, supra note 95, § 5(3).
168. Since this requires the intermediary to gather knowledge about the
transaction.
169. The Regulations, supra note 95, § 7.
170. Id. § 9.
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shell companies and trust companies are used in money laundering
to conceal the beneficial ownership of assets, Regulation 9 makes
clear that where an "applicant for business is or appears to be
acting otherwise than as principal,. . . reasonable measures must be
taken for the purpose of establishing the identity of any person on
whose behalf the applicant for business is acting."'' As a result,
institutions will be unable to sidestep liability by maintaining that
they checked the identity of the other party when that other party
is merely an agent for the launderer. This would have otherwise
been a major loophole, for as Rider has pointed out, the modern
money launderer is unlikely to be involved as a member of a
criminal organization.172  There is often a seemingly legitimate
"front man," who could normally pass off what he was doing, for
example, setting up an offshore company, as just another routine
transaction for another client.173 Regulation 9 ensures that
financial institutions look beyond the veneer of such transactions
to see who is the real beneficiary.74 They cannot claim that they
thought they were dealing with a fellow professional, and thus were
at no time suspicious.
Merely being aware of the identity of one's client would not,
however, seem to give an intermediary so much information about
the client and the client's business as to fix the intermediary with
potential constructive trust liability. For that level of knowledge,
it is submitted, the intermediary would need to know more than the
identity of its client to be deemed wanting in probity, even by the
exacting standards of the Chancery Division. Surely an intermedi-
ary would also need to be aware of the provenance of the funds in
question, and the nature of any relevant transaction, before it could
be expected to become suspicious under Finers principles and seek
directions from the court.
If this reasoning is correct, then the Regulations do not prima
facie require financial institutions to acquire dangerous levels of
information. An examination of the compliance systems utilized by
these institutions, however, makes clear that the dangers are there.
The Regulations were greeted with so much hype in the financial
world and institutions are so worried by the thought of criminal
liability, that some institutions seem to be gathering far more
information about their clients than is necessary under the
171. Id.
172. Rider, supra note 11, at 34.
173. Id.
174. The Regulations, supra note 95, § 9.
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Regulations. What they have presumably failed to realize is that
in the rush to avoid criminal penalties by gathering such informa-
tion, they are "putting their necks on the chopping board" as far as
civil liability is concerned.
It is impossible to reach conclusions about how compliance is
being effected across the board, but taking as an example the
identification systems of one London law firm, this pitfall is
immediately apparent. The firm starts by asking for the client's
name and address, and for a bank reference. If the reference
comes from an obscure bank "prudence suggests that we ask for
sight of the client's passport." In respect to a corporate client, a
copy of the Certificate of Incorporation, or the latest audited
accounts should be obtained, preferably from the auditors.
Obtaining these from the client's auditors provides an additional
layer of comfort since the auditors have had to exercise due
diligence themselves. As the Guidance Notes also stipulate, this
firm's procedure makes clear that "[iut would not be sufficient to
rely on details provided by the introducer of the new client. The
fact that a partner or other fee-earner may have known that
introducer for some years does not mean that the introducer has
been diligent in the investigation of the new client himself."175
This is prudent given the comment of the Court of Appeal in Agip,
"The respectability of the person making the introduction did not
relieve Mr. Jackson from the obligation to make proper enquiries
as to suspicious circumstances coming to his notice then or
subsequently."176
The firm then moves on, however, to satisfy itself as to the
identity of the funds, something not required by the Regulations.
Arguably, it should be required, because merely identifying
someone does not prevent him from laundering money. The firm
asks how the client intends to fund the proposed transaction. If the
client says bank borrowing, then this can easily be verified, but if
the client says from his/its own funds, then it is necessary to ask the
client where he or it earned or received that money from. ...
Since the innocent client may take offense from something not
dealt with sensitively, a standardized question should be asked:
The proposed transaction will involve the expenditure of money
by you/your company and I am therefore required to ask how
you propose to finance the transaction.
175. GUIDANCE NOTEs, supra note 15, at 54 (iv).
176. Agip, [1991] Ch. at 547.
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Such thoroughness is admirable although, despite the standardized
question, it is perhaps easy to imagine a potential client taking
offense! It seems fairly clear, however, that with such levels of
knowledge, the firm would find it difficult to avoid claims for
knowing assistance in the event that it emerged that the firm had
become involved in laundering the proceeds of a breach of trust.
The fee-earner has been required by the firm's guidelines to
become aware of the identity of the client, has been required to
become aware of the provenance of the funds, and has been told
to be alert to transactions that do not make commercial sense. If
he still proceeds to assist in a transaction, which subsequently
emerges to be a laundering one, is that not an example of the
"wilful blindness" of which Justice Millett was so critical in
Agip?
177
The way in which some intermediaries have reacted to the
Regulations and to section 52 DTA 1994, then, has resulted in an
over-hasty rush headlong into compliance with the criminal
legislation without consideration of the civil law implications.
C. The Problem of Tipping Off
If this approach to the new legislation is commonplace, then
every time an intermediary discloses its suspicions, it must consider
whether or not it has sufficient information about its client's
activities to be fixed with liability as constructive trustee. It has
been previously argued that some firms will have acquired such
information. However, even if a firm which is fairly certain that it
has not, what firm will risk a subsequent finding in court that it
has? The consequences of mistakenly assuming that one's
institution is ignorant enough to be in the clear would be horren-
dous, entailing potentially huge personal liabilities. Surely, any
intermediary will be sufficiently concerned about its own position
to approach the court for directions.
Finers v. Miro78 was perceived by some as a case resulting
in a procedure for financial intermediaries, enabling them to
safeguard their position vis-a-vis civil liability by approaching the
court for directions.179 This conclusion, no doubt correct when
viewed in isolation, demonstrates, nonetheless, a clear lack of
understanding between those who practice criminal and civil law.
177. See supra pp. 485-87.
178. [1991] 1 W.L.R. 35 (C.A.).
179. See generally Mummery, supra note 109.
1996]
496 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:3
The implications of section 52, DTA 1994 and section 93D of the
CJA 1988 arguably prevent such an approach for directions. By
section 52, DTA 1994, a person is guilty of an offense if "he knows
or suspects that another person is engaged in drug money launder-
ing; the information . . . came to his attention in the course of
his . . . business; and he does not disclose the information or other
matter to a constable as soon as is reasonably practical after it
comes to his attention."" Thus, an intermediary who becomes
suspicious of his client's activities is under a duty to report his
suspicions immediately, and faces a five-year prison term if he does
not.
One expert argues that this only relates to a suspicion of drug
money laundering, and since there is no mandatory requirement to
report a suspicion of "non-drug" money laundering,' section 52
does not raise any constructive trust problems for intermediaries.
After all, the beneficial owner of the money is the drugs trafficker,
who is scarcely likely to bring a claim in the Chancery Division."
The author disagrees. It is difficult to conceive of circumstanc-
es in which an intermediary is so certain of his exact suspicions that
he can say with any degree of confidence that, although he was
suspicious that his client was involved in money laundering, he was
absolutely positive that it was not drug-related laundering. Given
the penalties for failing to make timely disclosure, is an intermedi-
ary really going to hold back from making a disclosure because he
thinks that the funds being laundered are probably, the proceeds
of a fraud? There will always be an inkling of doubt, and hence a
suspicion, that the laundering might be of drug money. An expert,
writing on a related issue, goes so far as to admit:
It seems very difficult to define.., how any person, once their
[sic] initial suspicions had been aroused in the prescribed
circumstances [i.e. a suspicion of drug money laundering], could
reasonably distinguish between one financial transaction, which
they suspected was drug money laundering, and a later transac-
tion which they could subsequently say with any degree of
certainty was not drug money laundering."
180. Drug Trafficking Act, supra note 40, § 52.
181. Interview with Rowan Bosworth-Davies of Titmuss Sainer Dechert (Apr.
7, 1995). The author acknowledges gratefully the assistance derived from this
conversation.
182. Id.
183. Rowan Bosworth-Davies, Once disclosed, Twice shy, MONEY LAUNDERING
BULL., Mar. 1995, at 5.
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If this is correct, then, by the same argument, it would be very
difficult for a bank or other institution to assert that, while they
initially suspected money laundering, they were convinced that it
was not drug money laundering. Rather, given the way in which
intermediaries are falling over themselves to comply with the new
law, it is submitted that most intermediaries will contact NCIS'
s4
immediately.
It can equally be argued that although there is no mandatory
requirement to report a suspicion of a client's activity if that
activity is not suspected to be drugs-related, as soon as the
intermediary has gone so far as to accept or process funds on
behalf of that client, he has committed an offense under section
93A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, regardless of whether the
money is the proceeds of drug-dealing or any other crime. This is
the crime of "assisting another to retain the benefit of [any]
criminal conduct.""1 5 The only defense to prosecution under this
section is that the intermediary's suspicions were disclosed to a
constable. Thus, if the intermediary has had any dealings with the
client, disclosure is essential even if drug money laundering that is
suspected. Whichever view is taken, it seems prudent immediately
to inform NCIS.
Again, it is this rush to comply with the criminal legislation
that will see firms and banks in a subsequent dilemma about their
civil liabilities. If they do not make their disclosure to NCIS "as
soon as is reasonably practicable after it comes to [their] atten-
tion,, 186 they have committed an offense. Yet once they have
made a disclosure to NCIS, as will now be seen, an application to
the court on a Finers basis will almost certainly involve the offense
of tipping-off.
By section 93D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, "a person is
guilty of an offence if he knows or suspects that a constable is...
proposing to act in connection with an investigation which is being,
or is about to be, conducted into money laundering; and he
discloses to any other person information or any other matter
which is likely to prejudice that investigation, or proposed investiga-
tion."' It is submitted that making an application to the court
on the principles set down in Finers v. Miro will, prima facie,
184. The National Criminal Intelligence Service (Eng.).
185. Criminal Justice Act, supra note 10, § 93A.
186. As required by section 52 of the Drug Trafficking Act, supra note 40.
187. Criminal Justice Act, supra note 10, § 93D (emphasis added).
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amount to a breach of this provision. The suspicious client will be
named as defendant to the proceedings, and thus will immediately
be aware that he is under investigation by the authorities. The
intermediary, by approaching the court to avoid civil liability has,
as a result, undermined the criminal investigation and has unwit-
tingly committed an offense under section 93D. It is difficult to
avoid reaching such a conclusion. However benevolently the Act
is construed in favor of the intermediary, the courts cannot ignore
the wording of section 93D: any disclosure of one's suspicions to
anyone other than NCIS is likely to prejudice NCIS's investigation,
and will therefore constitute an offense.
188
Is there no way to avoid this dilemma? One practitioner
suggests that the solution is to make the Finers application to the
court before making the report to NCIS.' 89 He argues that until
the NCIS report has been filed, no intermediary can "know or
suspect that a constable is acting, or is proposing to act,"'' which
is the state of knowledge required before the tipping-off offense is
committed, thus, starting a Finers application at that stage will not
constitute tipping-off.1
9 1
With respect, if an intermediary knows that, within an hour of
making his Finers application, he will be making a report to NCIS
as required under section 52, surely he will "suspect that a
constable is proposing to act?"'" It could conceivably be argued
that at the time of making the application the constable could not
possibly be "proposing to act," because the constable at that time
would not know anything about the affair. If this is the basis of the
argument, then it is possible that it might prove a successful
defense. The courts should do all that they can to help an
intermediary who is caught in what is a particularly acute dilemma.
It is perfectly understandable that an intermediary should want to
protect himself on both civil and criminal flanks, and as long as he
acts in good faith throughout, criminal sanctions should not be
imposed.
The other problem in these circumstances is that if the Finers
application is made before disclosure to NCIS, NCIS could argue
that disclosure had not been made "as soon as is reasonably
188. See id.
189. Interview with Mr. Miles Laddie of Denton Hall (Apr. 7, 1995). The





practicable after it comes to [the intermediary's] attention, ' 193
thus constituting an offense under section 52. Although this
remains a theoretical possibility, it is submitted that unless
unnecessary delays had taken place before disclosure, the interme-
diary should not be held to have committed an offense. The
intermediary could argue, with some justification, that it was not
"reasonably practicable" to make disclosure to NCIS until the
Finers application had been lodged. The problem, of course, is that
a Finers application would almost certainly undermine a subsequent
police investigation, and NCIS as a result would have a fairly jaded
view of the activities of the intermediary and might not be
prepared similarly to interpret the Act.
D. Claims Against Intermediaries by Clients for Loss Suffered as
a Result of Disclosure and Subsequent Refusal to Accept
Instructions
Assuming that the intermediary successfully negotiates the
minefield of avoiding both criminal liability and a constructive trust
claim, it is necessary to consider his liability to the suspected client
in the event that his suspicions are groundless. What if, say, the
intermediary (a solicitor) has five million pounds sitting in a client
account to finance a property transaction for his client, purchasing
some land which is to be developed and rapidly resold at a twenty
percent profit. The day before contracts are to be exchanged, the
solicitor suddenly grows suspicious about the provenance of the
funds. He is concerned that they might be the proceeds of a
drugs-related crime, and will be in breach of section 52, DTA 1994
if he does not make a disclosure to NCIS. He makes a Finers
application to the court, immediately discloses his suspicions to
NCIS, and until he hears further from NCIS refuses to follow his
client's instructions in respect of the funds.1"4 The client is unable
to continue with the property transaction and the vendor finds
another purchaser who develops the property and sells it six
months later for six million pounds. NCIS then discontinues its
investigations, informing the solicitor that his suspicions were
groundless. The client has, by this stage, lost the chance to make
a million pound profit, and has instructed new solicitors who bring
on his behalf a legal malpractice action against the original firm.
193. Drug Trafficking Act, supra note 40, § 52.
194. To do otherwise, as seen above, constitutes an offense. See supra part
IV.F.2.
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This is a distinct possibility. The legislation does provide
certain immunity from suit for intermediaries that make disclosure,
but it is submitted that this immunity is not as comprehensive as
most commentators seem to think. It protects a firm only from an
action for breach of confidence; a firm cannot be sued for the act
of disclosure itself. Section 50, DTA 1994195 provides:
(3) (a) the disclosure shall not be treated as a breach of any
restriction upon the disclosure of information imposed by
contract, or by any enactment, regulation, rule of conduct or
other provision.1"
What is not clear is whether this would protect a firm from the
kind of action suggested in the circumstances above. On a strict
interpretation of section 50, it would appear not. The disgruntled
client would not be suing for the act of disclosure itself"9 but for
breach of contract with a quantifiable loss of one million pounds.
Neither are tort actions ruled out by the immunity. Thus it is
theoretically possible that even if the client had not suffered a
quantifiable monetary loss, it could still bring an action for
defamation. An allegation of involvement in money laundering,
that reached a market where a spotless reputation is of paramount
importance, would obviously be highly defamatory with an equally
high measure of damages.
Again, there is a worrying gap here between an intermediary's
criminal and civil law obligations. Section 52 demands disclosure
in circumstances where the civil law says that the bank should
continue to act in accordance with the client's mandate.1 98 Such
is apparent from the case of Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd.199
In that case, a partner of a firm of solicitors fraudulently withdrew
money from a client account to fund his compulsive gambling.2"
The question was whether the bank were liable for assisting him in
this fraudulent breach of trust by allowing him to continue to
withdraw funds."°  At first instance, the Judge accepted the
following propositions put to him by counsel:
195. Section 93A makes a similar provision for those who make a disclosure
under the Act: the Anti-Terrorist Acts also contain similar terms. See Drug
Trafficking Act, supra note 40, § 93A. See also supra part IV.D.
196. Drug Trafficking Act, supra note 40, § 50 (emphasis added).
197. For example, a breach of confidence.
198. Id. § 52.




- A bank is entitled to treat the customer's mandate at its
face value save in extreme cases.
- The bank is not entitled to question any transaction which
is in accordance with the mandate, unless a reasonable banker
would have grounds for believing that the authorised signatories
are misusing their authority.
- Mere suspicion or unease do not constitute reasonable
grounds and are not enough to justify the bank in failing to act
in accordance with the mandate.
- A bank is not required to act as an amateur detective.2°2
Thus, while section 52 mandates a bank to report its suspicions and
to refuse to accept a client's instructions, if these propositions are
good law, the bank cannot avoid civil liability for breaking its
mandate with the client through "mere suspicion or unease. '
Perhaps section 52 should be taken to have impliedly overruled this
part of the judgment in Lipkin Gorman.
Some comfort can be derived from the decision of Judge
Cruden sitting in the Hong Kong High Court in the case of Nanus
Asia Co. Inc v. Standered Chartered Bank.' In that case, Judge
Cruden held that where a bank had actual knowledge that funds
were the proceeds of a fraud from which arose a constructive trust,
the exceptional situation arose of the bank ceasing to be under its
contractual duty to comply with its customer's instructions. 5 It
is submitted, however, that such actual knowledge will be rare.
The possibilities of liability mentioned here are highly
speculative. It is clear, though, that the CJA 1993 does not
adequately implement the EC Money Laundering Directive, which
goes further in providing complete immunity, stipulating that
disclosure in good faith should not "involve the credit or financial
institution, its directors or employees in liability of any kind."'
Bearing in mind that the Act was designed to implement the
Directive, and that the interpretation of the Act is open to
question,' arguably the Act should be interpreted in the light of
the Directive and any action brought against an intermediary struck
out where the intermediary has acted in good faith. It remains to
202. Id.
203. See id.
204. [1990] 1 H.K.L.R. 392.
205. Id.
206. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 4, art. 9.
207. Did Parliament really intend to leave such a hole in the intermediary's
immunity from suit?
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be seen, however, how the courts will react to such an action if one
is brought by a suspected client suffering loss.
VI. Conclusion
The CJA 1993 and the Money Laundering Regulations have
heralded a new regime in the war against money laundering. While
it is too early to predict its usefulness, the new legislation shows
that the Government intends to ensure that Britain does not
become viewed as a haven for money laundering. It has, therefore
imposed stringent obligations on financial institutions, which are
particularly at risk of becoming tainted by laundering, in the hope
that the threat of severe criminal penalties will ensure their
cooperation.' The new legislation, viewed in isolation, is cer-
tainly capable of imposing criminal liability on those who assist in
money laundering, and should be an effective weapon against such
people if used to its full potential. To that extent, it is to be
welcomed.
What Parliament has not adequately considered are the civil
law ramifications of the new legislation. It is this oversight,
coupled with the recent activism of the courts in imposing construc-
tive trust liability, that has resulted in a trap of potentially huge
magnitude which awaits the unwitting intermediary who does not
comprehend the consequences of his suspicions.
Parliament can also be criticized for not providing the
complete immunity contained in the Directive for institutions that
make an erroneous disclosure. Arguably, the state should indemni-
fy those who are groundlessly reported under the new legislation
if, as a result, they have suffered loss. What is unacceptable is that
financial intermediaries should be required to comply with criminal
legislation when such compliance is not only wholly alien to their
traditional commercial practices, but also leaves them vulnerable to
a claim against them from their former clients for breach of
contract.
This Article has sought to highlight some problems with the
legislation. Many of them are speculative. It remains to be seen
whether the Chancery Division and the Old Bailey2°9 can strike
a balance between jailing money launderers on the one hand, and
releasing financial intermediaries from the horns of their particular-
ly acute dilemma on the other. In the meantime, intermediaries
208. See The Regulations, supra note 95.
209. The Central Criminal Court of England and Wales.
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would do well to recall the words of Mr. Justice Millett in Agip:
"Secrecy is the badge of fraud."21
210. [19901 Ch. 265.

